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NOTES

Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle
Undermining of Effective Desegregation

in Freeman v. Pitts
Bradley W. Joondeph*
Uncertaintycontinues to surroundthe issue of what steps a raciallysegregated school district must take to comply with the Equal ProtectionClause of
FourteenthAmendment, as interpretedby Brown v. Board of Education. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Freeman v. Pitts expanded district courts'
discretion in releasing school districts from court-ordered desegregation
plans, allowing courts to withdraw supervision incrementallyfrom individual
areas of school district operations. In this note, Bradley Joondeph argues that
such incremental withdrawal of supervision allows school districts to take
measures that have a resegregatory effect on areas in which compliance has
been achieved, and may therefore undermine the ultimate goal of court-ordered desegregation plans: eliminating the racial identifiability of formerly
segregated schools. Mr. Joondeph suggests the Court insteadshould have endorsed an alternative system of "prophylactic" supervision that would maintain court supervision over all areas of school operations until each area has
been successfully desegregated.

INTRODUCTION

In Brown v. Board of Education,I the Supreme Court held that racial segre-

gation of public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 2 concluding that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. ' 3 While the central holding of Brown is
clear, the federal courts continue to struggle to define precisely what segregated
* Third-year student, Stanford Law School. This note is dedicated to the memories of Dean
Charles Hamilton Houston and Justice Thurgood Marshall, whose contributions to the struggle for equal
justice under law are unparalleled in this country's history. I wish to thank Professor Gerald Gunther,
Andrew Berke, Chris Guthrie, Srija Srinivasan, and my parents, Donald and Priscilla Joondeph, for their
generous help and support. I also wish to thank the editors at the StanfordLaw Review for their dedication and thoughtful contributions.
1.
2.
3.

347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
Id. at 495.
Id.
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school districts must do to comply with the Equal Protection Clause, 4 and when
5
district courts should return control to local authorities.
The Constitution forbids segregation in public schools stemming from intentional discrimination, often referred to as de jure segregation. 6 In contrast,
de facto segregation-resulting from factors other than school officials' purposeful actions-raises no constitutional concerns. 7 If a school district is found
to be operating a de jure segregated school system, it must "do more than
4. The Court uses the term "unitary status" to describe the point at which a school district has
completely dismantled its previously "dual" system, thereby satisfying its Constitutional requirements.
See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,435-36. As the Court recently explained in Board of
Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), "[c]ourts have used the terms 'dual' to denote a school
system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and 'unitary' to describe a
school system which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution." 1d. at
246.
Although virtually every desegregation decision invokes the term "unitary," courts have had difficulty defining when school systems achieve unitary status. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 144344 (1992) (stating that "the term 'unitary' is not a precise concept" and "does not have fixed meaning
or content"); Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation:Determination of Unitary
Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation,58 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 1105, 1107 n.7
(1990) (noting that "[t]here is a considerable amount of confusion about the terminology in this area");
Martha M. McCarthy, Elusive "Unitary Status," 69 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 9 (1991) (arguing that unitary
status remains subject to multiple interpretations); Note, Allocating the Burden of Proofaftera Finding
of Unitariness in School DesegregationLitigation, 100 Htv. L. Rav. 653, 662 (1987) [hereinafter
Allocating the Burden of Proof] (observing that the Court has never "produced a single, comprehensive
statement defining unitariness").
5. See, e.g., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1444-45 (allowing courts to commence partial withdrawal of
supervision before school districts have achieved full compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment);
Dowell, 498 U.S. 249-50 (stating that a district court should decide whether to return control to local
officials after considering "whether the [officials] had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree... and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable"); United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing a district court to release
a school district from court control "when it eliminates the vestiges of a segregated system and achieves
a true unitary system"); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 330 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that it was reasonable for a district court to retain control over a school system "where the school defendants had yet to
achieve compliance with... part of the original desegregation plan"); Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir.) ("Once... a remedy is fashioned, the district court retains jurisdiction until it is clear the that unlawful segregation has been completely eliminated. But once the goal of a
unitary school system is achieved, the district court's role ends."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,458 (1979) (stating that "[p]roof of
purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substantial part of the
system itself is prima facie proof of a dual school system"); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (stating that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause").
7. See, e.g., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1447 (stating that school systems have no obligation to
desegregate "when the [racial] imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de jure system nor to a later
violation by the school district but rather to independent demographic forces"); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977) (Milliken 11) (noting that "the Court has consistently held that the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 240 (1976) (remarking that the existence of "both predominantly black and predominantly white
schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause"); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971) (emphasizing that courts may not act "where racial
imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action
of state authorities"); see also James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: PoliticalReconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 354
(1990) (stating that the Court's desegregation decisions during the 1970s made clear "that racial separation itself, even when coupled with vast disparities in economic input and educational outcome, did not
suffice" to justify judicial intervention).
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abandon its prior discriminatory purpose." 8 Rather, the segregated school district is charged with "the affirmative duty to take all steps necessary to elimi-

nate the vestiges of the unconstitutional dejure system." 9 Not until the school
district has purged itself entirely of the segregated, "dual" system and replaced
it with a nondiscriminatory "unitary" system of education is it fully desegregated for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0
The process of court-ordered desegregation begins with a finding that discrimination by school officials has led to segregation in a school district."
Upon such a finding, the district court usually orders the school district to come
forward with a comprehensive plan to desegregate its schools. 12 If the court
finds the school district's plan unsatisfactory, the court must devise such a
scheme itself.' 3 In either case, the school system is legally bound by the desegregation plan, 14 and the district court retains jurisdiction over the case until the

school district is fully desegregated. 15 Once the school district believes it has
8. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Dayton 11).
9. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that "[tihe objective
today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation"); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (stating that nonunitary school districts are "clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
892 F.2d 851, 861 (10th Cir. 1989) (describing the School Board's obligation "to act affirmatively, not
merely to act neutrally"), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992), reinstated,978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993), (Brown III); J.HAgvm WnIKNSON I, FROM BROWNTO BAKKE:
Tim SupRoPus CouRT AND SCHOOL INrEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 116 (1979) (discussing how Green
"removed, at long last, from black children the onus of achieving integration and threw it squarelyaffirmatively-onto the backs of local school boards"); Allocating the Burden of Proof,supra note 4, at
653 (stating that a finding of intentional segregation "places the school board under an affirmative duty
to change the system from a dual to a 'unitary' one").
10. Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (holding that dejure segregated school systems are under the obligation to affirmatively desegregate "until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed"); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979) (explaining that the
school system was in violation of the Constitution because of "its failure to eliminate the consequences
of its past intentionally segregative policies").
11. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240 (1991) (initiating court supervision
after plaintiffs demonstrated that "Oklahoma City was operating a dual school system-one that was
intentionally segregated by race").
12. Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (holding that an offending school board must "come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now"); see also Columbus,
443 U.S. at 453 (ordering school district to submit "systemwide desegregation plan" after the district
court found that segregation of the district's schools " 'directly resulted from [the Board's] intentional
segregative acts and omissions' ") (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 259
(S.D. Ohio 1977)).
13. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NovAK, T.rEATIs ON CONsTrrtoNAL LAW
§ 18.9(a)(1) (2d ed. 1992); see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 ("[l1f school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations," then "the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad,
for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.").
14. See, e.g., Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 438 (1976) (explaining that the
school system's violation of its desegregation order "can result in punishment for contempt in the form
of either a fine or imprisonment").
15. The role of district courts in monitoring compliance with Brown was set by the Court in
Brown I. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955) (Brown 11). As Laurence Tribe
notes, " 'Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings,' the
federal district courts were delegated primary responsibility to supervise the 'transition to a system of
public education freed of racial discrimination.' " LAURENCE H. TRIEE, AMERICAN CoNsOrrrioNAL
LAW § 16-18, at 1488-89 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Brown 1, 349 U.S. at 299).
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fulfilled its obligations under the court-ordered plan, it may petition the court
for a declaration that the school district has achieved "unitary status," and for
dissolution of the court's desegregation order. 16 If the court finds that the
school district has successfully desegregated, it will return control of the system
to local authorities. 17 Once declared unitary, the school district's constitutional
obligations are the same as those of any other nonsegregated school system.' 8
In Freeman v. Pitts,'9 the Supreme Court expanded the discretion district
courts may exercise in releasing school districts from court-ordered desegregation plans. Specifically, Freeman held that district courts may withdraw their
supervision over formerly segregated school systems incrementally. 20 Writing
for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that in cases of "partial compliance' '-where the school district has achieved unitary status in some but not all
areas of its operations-the court may return control of the successfully desegregated areas to school officials while retaining supervision over areas that re2
main segregated. '
This note explores the legal basis for the Court's holding in Freeman and
discusses the implications of its approval of incremental withdrawal of judicial
supervision in desegregation litigation. Part I examines the Supreme Court's
analysis in Freeman. It contends that the Court's broad reading of Pasadena
Board of Education v. Spangler2 ignores the important conceptual distinction
between mandating that a school district take affirmative steps to desegregate
and requiring the district to refrain from taking actions that have defacto segregatory effects. Part II examines the ways in which Freeman's approval of incremental withdrawal redefines unitary status. Part In discusses how Freeman
may permit nonunitary school districts to incrementally resegregate their
schools and illustrates how such incremental resegregation can lead to the release from judicial supervision of formerly segregated school districts which
have yet to eliminate the racial identifiability of their schools. Finally, Part IV
suggests that the Court should have required district courts to retain supervision
over all aspects of school systems that retain vestiges of de jure segregation in
order to prevent such districts from taking steps that may exacerbate segregation in their schools. Part IV also discusses an important issue left unresolved
by Freeman: what showing a plaintiff must make in order for a court to reassert control over previously released areas of a partially compliant school system. It contends that a plaintiff should only have to prove that district court
16. See, e.g., Spangler,427 U.S. at 428-29.
17. Allocating the Burden of Proof, supra note 4, at 661-62 ("Once a formerly dual school
system is declared unitary, and the district court has terminated any injunctions, that court relinquishes
its power to evaluate and alter educational plans. The primary consequence of unitariness is, then, that
the school board regains ongoing control over the decisionmaking process in the system.").
18. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); David S. Tatel, Desegregation Versus
School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, 4 STANs.
L. & PoL'Y REv. 61, 63 (1992) (commenting that, after
the supervising court has declared the school district "unitary," the system's "legal obligations are no
different from any other school district").
19. 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992).
20. Id. at 1444-45.
21. Id. at 1445-46.
22. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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supervision is "reasonably necessary" for the school system to achieve unitary
status.

I.

FREEMAN, SANGLER, AND THE

DUTY

TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO

DESEGREGATE

A.

The Holding in Freeman

In 1954, the year the Supreme Court decided Brown, schools in DeKalb
County, Georgia, were segregated by law.23 Like many southern school districts, the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) resisted the Court's mandate
to desegregate.24 DCSS did not take any steps to dismantle its dual system
until the 1966-67 school year,25 when DCSS implemented a "freedom of
choice" plan designed to enable all DCSS students to attend the school of their
choice within the system.2 6 In practice, only a modest number of AfricanAmerican students took advantage of the program, and DCSS's schools remained almost completely segregated. 27
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided in Green v. County School Board28
that the implementation of a "freedom of choice" plan was not enough by
itself to satisfy a school district's obligation to desegregate. 29 Two months
later, a group of African-American DeKalb residents initiated a class action suit
against DCSS seeking that it dismantle its discriminatory system. 30 In response, DCSS, in conjunction with the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), devised a comprehensive plan to desegregate the DCSS
schools. 3 1 The district court approved the plan in 1969.32 From 1969 to 1986,
while DCSS remained under judicial supervision, DeKalb County underwent
dramatic demographic changes, such that the proportion of African-American
23. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. Whether district courts should be permitted to withdraw supervision over school districts incrementally in desegregation litigation was not the only issue contested in
Freeman.Significant portions of the briefs and the opinion considered whether the existing racial imbalance in student assignments was a "vestige" of the school district's past discrimination. See id. at
1449-50; Brief of Petitioners at 4-5, Freeman (No. 89-1290); Respondents' Brief at 4-7, Freeman (No.
89-1290). This debate focused on the school district's record of student assignment, with respondents
contending that the district had never effectively desegregated or achieved unitary status. Id. Dramatic
intervening demographic shifts in DeKalb County made determining whether the original constitutional
violation caused the present segregation of students quite difficult. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1437-39.
24. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. DeKalb County is located in suburban Atlanta.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
29. Md at 439-41.
30. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436.
31. Id.
32. Id. The plan proposed closing each of the district's all-black schools and establishing neighborhood school attendance zones. Brief of Petitioners, Freeman (No. 89-1290). The DCSS/HEW plan
was implemented at the start of the 1969-1970 school year. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. Although
there remains some dispute over the issue, see note 23 supra, DCSS schools apparently were "effectively desegregated" for a period of time immediately following the adoption of the DCSS/IHEW plan.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1439. Contra id. at 1455 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that "the students
in DeKalb County, Ga., never [had] attended a desegregated school system even for one day").
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students grew from 5.6 percent to 47 percent of the student population.3 3 At
34
the same time, segregated residential patterns developed in DeKalb County.
The combination of these demographic changes and DCSS's policy of assigning students based on neighborhood attendance zones led to the develop35
ment of several predominantly one-race schools.
After seventeen years of court supervision, DCSS in 1986 petitioned the
district court for a declaration that it had achieved unitary status and sought
final dismissal of the litigation.3 6 The district court analyzed DCSS's progress
toward unitary status using a set of factors identified by the Supreme Court in
Green as indicative of a school system's compliance with its desegregation
obligation. 37 These factors (or "Green areas") direct the focus of a court's
inquiry to primary aspects of a school system's operations: student assignment,
38
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and physical facilities.
Since Green, the Supreme Court has generally exhorted lower courts to examine each Green area when deciding whether a school district is unlawfully
segregated. 39 The Green factors have therefore provided a useful framework to
4°
guide district courts' inquiries into constitutional compliance.
In Freeman, the district court analyzed each Green area independently and
33. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1438. From 1976 to 1986, the overall student population remained
stable at around 70,000. Id. Enrollment in elementary schools decreased overall by 15%, but enrollment
of African-American students increased by 86%. Id. During the same time period, DCSS high school
enrollment decreased by 16%, while African-American student enrollment increased by 119%. Id
34. Id. In 1969, the county was well integrated residentially, but by 1986 the northern half of the
county had become predominantly white and the southern half almost entirely African-American. Id
Present-day DeKalb County is to a large extent residentially segregated. d
35. Id. In the 1986-1987 school year, 50% of DCSS's black students attended schools where the
student population was at least 90% black, and 62% of DCSS's black students attended schools whose
proportion of black students was more than 20% greater than the system-wide average. Id Twentyseven percent of white DCSS students attended schools that were at least 90% white, and 59% attended
schools whose white student population exceeded the system-wide average by more than 20%. Id Five
of 22 high schools and 18 of 74 elementary schools were more than 90% black. Id. Five high schools
were at least 80% white, and 10 elementary schools were at least 90% white. Id.
36. Id. at 1437. DCSS's desegregation plan underwent little modification between its adoption
and 1986. In 1972, DCSS implemented a Majority-to-Minority (M-to-M) transfer plan. Id. at 1440.
The M-to-M plan permitted a limited number of students to transfer from a school in which they were a
member of the racial majority to one at which they were a racial minority. Id at 1437. By the 19861987 school year, 4500 of DCSS's 72,000 students were participating in the program. Id at 1440.
During the 1980s, DCSS implemented a magnet school program and some "experience programs,"
both of which encouraged integration of the district's students. Id. A magnet school program consists of
"a school with a special educational program designed to attract voluntary transfers from outside the
area, thus producing integration without compulsion." GARY ORPIMLD, Musr WE Bus? SEaoma'mo
ScHooLs AND NATIONAL POLICY 133 n.52 (1978). Frequently these programs are designed to attract
highly talented students or students interested in a particular discipline (e.g., science).
37. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1437.
38. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). In Green, the Court emphasized that
school desegregation "extend[ed] not just to the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to
every facet of school operations." Id.
39. See, e.g., Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (analyzing the school
district's compliance in student assignment independent of compliance in other areas such as the hiring
and promotion of teachers and administrators); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 18 (1971) (stating that "existing policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, transportation,
extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most important indicia of a segregated system").
40. See, e.g., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443 (stating that "[the Green factors are a measure of the
racial identifiability of schools in a system that is not in compliance with Brown" and that "district
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found that DCSS had achieved only partial compliance. 4 1 DCSS had successfully desegregated the areas of student assignment, physical facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities, but remained unlawfully segregated with
respect to faculty assignment, staff assignment, and quality of education. 42 Instead of retaining supervision over the entire system, however, the district court
opted for a rather unique approach: It returned control over DCSS's "unitary"
Green areas to local authorities, while retaining supervision over those areas
that remained unlawfully segregated.4 3 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's incremental withdrawal of supervision. 44 The court of
appeals held that, as a matter of law, district courts may not relinquish control
over any area of a school district's operations until the school district has completely desegregated. 45
In a unanimous judgment, 4 6 the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, affirming much of the district court's decision. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy stated that the "duty and responsibility of a school district
once segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of
courts [should] fashion remedies that address all these components of elementary and secondary school

systems").
41. Id. at 1437-42.
42. Id. at 1437. The district court first analyzed DCSS's compliance with respect to student
assignment and held that, when DCSS closed its all-black schools in 1969 and implemented a racially
neutral system of pupil assignment based on neighborhood attendance zones, DCSS had already desegregated that area of its operations. Id. at 1439. The court found that disproportionate racial concentration of DCSS students in 1986 was due to voluntary demographic shifts and was not attributable to any
action by the school district. Id. at 1439-41. Accordingly, the court concluded that DCSS had achieved
"maximum practical desegregation" with respect to student assignment. Id. at 1440.
The district court then evaluated DCSS's compliance in each of the remaining Green areas. The
court found that the school system assigned a disproportionate number of African-American teachers
and administrators to predominantly black schools and concluded that DCSS remained unlawfully segregated with respect to this area. IL at 1441. In assessing the relative quality of education in DeKalb
schools, the court found that the faculties in predominantly white schools were better educated and more
experienced than their counterparts in predominantly African-American schools. Id. at 1442. In addition, per pupil expenditure was higher in predominantly white than in predominantly black schools. Id.
Consequently, the court found DCSS still in noncompliance with regard to the disparity in the quality of
its students' educations. Il Finally, with respect to facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities, the district court concluded that DCSS had successfully desegregated these areas. Id.
43. Id.
44. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (lth Cir. 1989), rev'4 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
45. L. at 1450. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in
part. Id. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that DCSS had not achieved
unitary status and that the district court should retain jurisdiction. Id. at 1450. However, the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with the trial court's holding that a district court may incrementally withdraw its
supervision over a school district after a desegregation order. IL at 1446-47. DCSS appealed this part
of the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of "whether a district court may
relinquish its supervision and control over those aspects of a school system in which there has been
compliance with a desegregation decree if other aspects of the system remain in noncompliance." Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443.
46. Although the judgment was unanimous, the Court was divided in its reasoning. Only Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter, and White joined Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court.
Despite joining Justice Kennedy's opinion, Justices Scalia and Souter each wrote separate concurrences
expressing widely disparate opinions about the role of federal courts in school desegregation. Id at
1450, 1454. Justice Blackmun wrote his own concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
expressing still different reasoning. L at 1455. Justice Thomas participated in neither the consideration
nor decision of the case.
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the unconstitutional de jure system." 47 The Court recognized that Green and
subsequent decisions provide important guidance to district courts in evaluating
whether formerly segregated school districts have successfully achieved unitary
status.4 8 But Justice Kennedy noted that while the concept of unitary status had
been "helpful" in defining the scope of an appropriate remedy, it should not
"confine the discretion and authority of the District Court[s]."

49

Justice Kennedy next discussed the Court's holding in PasadenaBoard of
Education v. Spangler.5 0 In that case, the Court had ruled that the "District
Court exceeded its remedial authority in requiring annual readjustment of
school attendance zones" when racial imbalance in student enrollment was attributable to voluntary demographic shifts rather than discrimination by the
school district.5 ' Quoting from Spangler,the Freeman Court stated that once a
district court has " 'implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern... the
District Court ha[s] fully performed its function of providing the appropriate
remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.' "52
The Court stated that the logic of Spangler determined the result in Freeman. Maintaining that it was only "mak[ing] explicit the rationale that was
central in Spangler,"53 the Court held that "federal courts have the authority to
relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages,
before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations." 54 In cases of partial compliance, district courts may "return control to
the school system in those areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting
further judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance
with the court decree." 55 In other words, the school district may achieve unitary status in some Green areas before others, and district courts may return
control over the desegregated areas to local authorities prior to their achieving
full compliance.
The Court justified its holding by emphasizing that judicial supervision has
always been "intended as a 'temporary measure.' "56 Justice Kennedy noted
that local autonomy in decisions affecting elementary and secondary education
" 'is a vital national tradition,' "15 and that the "ultimate objective" of courtordered desegregation has always been to return governance of school systems
to local authorities. 58 The incremental withdrawal of court supervision would,
47. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1443.
48. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
49. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443-44.
50. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
51. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1444.
52. Id. (quoting Spangler, 427 U.S. at 437).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1445.
55. Id. at 1446.
56. Id. at 1445 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991)).
57. Id. (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (Dayton 1)).
58. Id. (stating that, "[a]lthough this temporary measure has lasted decades, the ultimate objective has not changed-to return school districts to the control of local authorities"). The Court had
discussed the importance of returning school systems to local control in decisions prior to Freeman.
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (Milliken II) (stating that "the federal courts
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the Court argued, facilitate a smooth transfer of control over school districts
59
from the judiciary to local officials.

B.

Freeman's Misplaced Reliance on Spangler

In approving the district court's incremental withdrawal of supervision over
DCSS, the Court in Freemanrelied heavily on PasadenaBoard of Education v.
Spangler. But the Court's contention that Freeman merely makes explicit the
rationale of Spangler60 ignores important differences between the two cases.
While the two decisions are not inconsistent, Spanglerin no way compelled the
Court's ruling in Freeman to permit incremental withdrawal. Rather, Freeman
decided an important unresolved issue in desegregation law without the Court
so acknowledging.
1. The holding in Spangler.
The issue raised in Spangler was whether the district court had exceeded its
authority by ordering the Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD) to insure
that "there [was] no school in the District, elementary or junior high or senior
high school, with a majority of any minority students." 6' The Court prefaced
its discussion by affirming its prior holding in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,62 where the Court stated that there are limits to what
courts can require of school districts in fulfilling their obligations to desegregate.63 The Spangler Court also reiterated language from Swann concerning
district courts' use of fixed proportionalities to achieve racial balance.64 While
district courts may use mathematical ratios as "a starting point in the process of
shaping a remedy," they cannot use them as "an inflexible requirement" in
in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs, consistent with the Constitution").
59. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445. Some commentators support the Court's increasing emphasis
on returning school districts to local control as soon as possible. See, e.g., John E. Canady, Jr., Comment, Overcoming OriginalSin: The Redemption of the DesegregatedSchool System. 27 Hous. L. Ra,.
557, 558 (1990) (arguing that "protracted school desegregation litigation saps the strength of educational institutions, is fundamentally unfair to the schools, and leads to confusion about the role of the
judiciary in the United States").
60. Freeman, 112 S. CL at 1444.
61. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 428 (1976) (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena
Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 505 (C.D. Cal. 1970)). After the district court found that the school
district was unlawfully segregated, school officials devised a desegregation plan (the "Pasadena Plan")
which included the "no majority of any minority" provision. Id. In the first year under the Pasadena
Plan, the school district complied with the court's order with respect to attendance patterns, and minority enrollment did not exceed white enrollment in any PUSD school. Id. at 431. But because of subsequent demographic shifts in Pasadena, PUSD failed to comply literally with this requirement for the next
two school years. Id.at 435-36. After operating for four years under the Pasadena Plan, PUSD petitioned the district court for modification of the "no majority of any minority" requirement, but the
District Court denied this motion. d at 428-29. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's judgment. Id. at 429.
62. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
63. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434. In Swann, the Court stated that no "fixed ...guidelines can be
established as to how far a court can go,but it must be recognized that there are limits." 402 U.S. at 28.
64. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434.
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fashioning desegregation orders. 65 Consequently, "[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official
66
action is eliminated from the system."
Comparing the "no majority of any minority" requirement against this language in Swann, the Spangler Court concluded that "the inconsistency between
the two is clear."

67

According to the Court, PUSD's implementation of its

desegregation plan established a nondiscriminatory system of student assignment. 68 The school district had therefore discharged its affirmative duty to
desegregate with respect to student assignment and "the District Court had
fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy for previous
racially discriminatory attendance patterns." 69 All resegregation occurring subsequent to the plan's implementation was due to "people randomly moving
into, out of, and around the PUSD area." 70 Because the disparities were the
result of de facto residential segregation, the Court could not order the school
district to counteract them. Thus, in "requir[ing] annual readjustment of attendance zones so that there would not be a majority of any minority in any
71
Pasadena public school, the District Court exceeded its authority."
Most importantly for Freeman's analysis, the Spangler Court held that
PUSD had discharged its duty to desegregate student attendance despite indications that PUSD had yet to comply with other aspects of its desegregation order.72 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the school
district may not have successfully eliminated discrimination in the hiring and
promotion of faculty and staff.73 But the Court reasoned that the continued
existence of unlawful segregation in certain areas does not undercut the force of
the principle expressed in Swann: A court cannot order a school district to
readjust its attendance patterns once it has fulfilled its "affirmative duty to
desegregate." 74
Ultimately, Spangler stands for three propositions: (1) courts are limited as
to the affirmative steps they can require a school district to undertake under a
desegregation order; (2) this limit is by definition the point at which the school
district has eliminated all vestiges of the unlawfully segregated system; and (3)
a school system may eliminate such vestiges sequentially, and may therefore
discharge its duty to desegregate in some Green areas before others. Impor65. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25.
66. Id. at 31-32.
67. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434.
68. Id. at 436-37.
69. Id. at 437.
70. Id. at 435-36.
71. Id. at 435.
72. Id. at 436; see also Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation
and the Finding of UnitaryStatus, 40 OKI.A. L. Rnv. 519, 530 (1987) (contending that "[the Spangler
decision is important" because it "divided the concept of a unitary school system into component parts
that can be treated separately").
73. Spangler,427 U.S. at 436.
74. Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971)).
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tantly, the Spanglerdecision did not address the issue of whether, having satisfied its duty to desegregate student attendance, PUSD was entitled to autonomy
to implement any student assignment plan of its choosing. More broadly, Spangler left unanswered the question of whether a court that cannot require a
school system to take further affirmative steps to desegregate a particular
Green area must still prevent the school district from taking actions that,
although not motivated by discrimination, have segregatory effects.
2. Nuances of the holdings in Freeman and Spangler.
By allowing district courts to relinquish control over unitary Green areas,
Freeman implicitly held that a formerly segregated school system's only obligation in each such area is the duty to take affirmative steps to desegregate.
Once individual Green areas are successfully desegregated, district courts have
the discretion to limit their supervision to those areas in which the school district has yet to achieve compliance. 75 Freeman therefore viewed Spangler's
definition of the constitutional obligations of a formerly de jure school system
with respect to each Green area as binary: Either the school district has an
obligation to take affirmative steps to desegregate, or it has no duties at all.
Because the Court lacked clear precedent on the issue, its decision to permit
incremental withdrawal of supervision is consistent with developed desegregation jurisprudence. What seems unjustifiable about Freeman is the Court's failure to address explicitly whether nonunitary school districts must refrain from
taking actions which have de facto segregatory effects. The decision in Freeman completely overlooks the distinction between a school district's obligation
to take affirmative steps to desegregate-which Spangler addressed-and the
school district's duty to refrain from actions that would have a defacto segregatory impact. This distinction is indeed a subtle one, but the Freeman Court's
contention that it was merely reaffirming Spangler is nevertheless clearly inaccurate. The Court in fact resolved an important outstanding issue in desegregation law without a candid discussion of the merits of the issue.
3.

The problems inherent in Freeman's holding.

Freeman's binary conception of a formerly segregated school district's obligations under Brown is appropriate in describing the system's compliance as a
whole. Once the school district has completely desegregated, it has satisfied its
constitutional obligations, and court supervision is appropriately withdrawn.
But this framework does not make much sense when applied to Green areas
individually. A multitier framework that requires school districts to refrain
from aggravating existing segregation until they have completely desegregated
would be more appropriate in this context.
There are several compelling reasons for requiring nonunitary school districts to desist from enacting policies that have de facto segregatory effects.
For instance, partially compliant school systems have yet to fully satisfy their
75.

Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446-47 (1992).
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constitutional obligations and remain, as a whole, unlawfully segregated. One
might fear that, unless school systems are enjoined from taking actions with
segregative effects, released areas may become de facto resegregated prior to
the school system fully complying with the Constitution. Such resegregation in
formerly unitary areas may in turn inhibit school districts' progress toward desegregation in other Green areas. And, as the Court itself has stated, a formerly
segregated school system's affirmative duty to desegregate includes "the obligation not to take any action that'76would impede the process of disestablishing
the dual system and its effects."
Construing school districts' obligations with respect to individual Green
areas to include a duty to refrain from de facto segregatory actions even after
achieving compliance in that area would have allayed these important concerns.
The Freeman Court chose instead to emphasize the importance of returning
control to local authorities at the earliest practicable date. Consequently, the
Court held that a school district's successful desegregation of a Green area
relieves it of all obligations in that area.
I.

REDEFINING UNITARY STATUS

A second important implication of the Court's holding in Freeman is that it
effectively redefined unitary status. It did so in the first instance by describing
discrete aspects of DCSS as "unitary." Before Freeman, the Court had applied the expression only to entire school districts that had eliminated all ves-

tiges of the discriminatory system. 77 Even in Spangler, where the Court
approved the separate analysis of Green areas, the Court did not use the term

"unitary" to describe individual aspects of PUSD's operations. 78 By doing so

in Freeman, the Court divorced the concept from its essential meaning-the

elimination of all vestiges of the racially discriminatory system.
Freeman'sapproval of incremental withdrawal also altered the meaning of

unitary status in a more fundamental way. Since Brown, the essential question
addressed by the courts in desegregation litigation has been whether the formerly segregated school district is operating in a "racially nondiscriminatory"
fashion.7 9 Inquiry into whether a school district has successfully desegregated

has focused broadly on school systems as a whole rather than narrowly on
discrete facets of such systems. For instance, the Court stated in Green that
"the question [is] whether the Board has achieved the 'racially nondiscrimina76. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979). The Court expressed the same
concern in Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), approving the district court's rejection
of a school system's attempt to divide itself into two separate school districts because "its effect would
... impede the process of dismantling a dual system." 460 U.S. at 470.
Recent circuit court opinions suggest that school systems may retain residual obligations after discharging their duty to take affirmative steps to desegregate in specific Green-type areas. For example,
in Harris v. Crenshaw Board of Education, 968 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1992), the court stated that nonunitary school districts "are obligated.., to avoid any official action that has the effect of perpetuating or
reestablishing a dual system." Id. at 1095.
77. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
78. See Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
79. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
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tory school system' " mandated by Brown.8 0 Green further noted that "[t]he
obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation," 8 1 and defined desegregation as the "conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial
system." 82 A year later, in United States v. Montgomery County Boardof Education,8 3 the Court described "the basic task" of formerly de jure systems as
"achieving a public school system wholly free from racial discrimination." 84
As the Court explained in Swann, "[t]he objective [is] to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 8 5 The Court reiterated in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick8 6 that, "[w]here a racially
discriminatory school system has been found to exist, Brown II imposes the
duty on local school boards to 'effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.' "87
Thus, the determination of whether school districts have successfully desegregated has historically consisted of more than consideration of the Green factors alone. Rather, district courts have more broadly examined whether school
systems are providing their students with a nonracial, nondiscriminatory education. Although the Green factors have guided a district court's inquiry, they
have not defined it. They have been no more than a measure of a school district's progress toward desegregation. For instance, at their inception in Green,
the Court invoked them only to illustrate the extent of the system's segregation.8 8 Similarly, the Court in Swann stated that the Green factors "were
among the most important indicia of a segregated system." 89 Moreover, in
Freeman itself, the Court stated that "[t]he Green factors are a measure of the
racial identifiability of schools in a system that is not in compliance with
Brown." 90
The Green factors provide a framework for evaluating a school system's
compliance, but a supervising district court's inquiry has not been limited to
these areas alone. The question of whether an unlawfully segregated school
district has achieved unitary status has always been greater than the sum of its
Green factor parts. 91 As the Court suggested in Freeman,there may be impor80. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968) (quoting Brown II,349 U.S. at 301).
81. a at 439.
82. Id. at 441. The Court also emphasized that school districts must "take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." Ii at 437-38.
83. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
84. Id. at 232. This language was also quoted (and given emphasis) in Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 282-83 (1977) (Milliken II).
85. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (emphasis added).

86. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
87. Id. at 458 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301).
88. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
89. Swam, 402 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
90. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992) (emphasis added).
91. See Brief for the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 15, Freeman, 112 S. CL at 1430 (No. 89-1290) ("If particular discriminatory
practices are considered incrementally and in isolation, the sum of the parts of the system will be less
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tant additional indicators worthy of consideration in evaluating compliance. 92
In addition to the Freeman majority's acknowledgment that the Green factors
"need not be a rigid framework," 93 Justice Souter reiterated that "Green's list
of specific factors need not be treated as exclusive." 94 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's opinion approved of the district court's use of quality of education as an
additional Green factor, stating that "[it was an appropriate exercise of [the
district court's] discretion" not only to address the factors discussed in Green
but also "to inquire whether other elements ought to be identified.'"'9
Freeman'sapproval of area-by-area withdrawal, however, significantly narrows the breadth of a district court's analysis. Once a district court articulates
its criteria for measuring a school district's progress toward unitary statuseven if it selects other criteria in addition to the traditional Green factors-its
inquiry is necessarily limited to the chosen factors. From that point forward,
unitary status, by definition, equals the school district's satisfying its affirmative duty to desegregate each selected area. 96 Thus, in cases where the district
court withdraws supervision incrementally, Freeman implicitly elevates the selected Green areas to the exclusive indicia of compliance. Achieving compliance in each Green area essentially becomes an end in itself rather than a
measure of overall compliance. The implication of Freeman,therefore, is that,
once a school district has incrementally desegregated each articulated area, the
district court may declare the system unitary even if the school district remains
segregated as measured by other criteria. 97 As a result, actual vestiges of the
discriminatory system not captured by the enumerated Green areas may persist
even after the school district is declared unitary and the litigation is dismissed.
This implication of Freeman is particularly troubling because it permits district courts to ignore one of the most significant manifestations of segregation:
the racial identifiability of a district's schools. 98 As the Court has repeatedly
emphasized, the elimination of racial identifiability from a system's schools is
vital to remedying the harm caused by intentional segregation. 99 Indeed, prior
to Freeman, school districts that failed to eliminate the racial identifiability of
than the Constitutionally mandated whole-a school system cleansed of the vestige of de jure
segregation").
92. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1446-47.

93.

ld

94. Id. at 1454 n.1 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
95. Id. at 1446.
96. Note that this is true if, at the time the district court announces the Green areas with which it
will evaluate the school district's progress toward unitary status, the school system has achieved compliance in all, some, or none of the articulated areas. Regardless, the district court's inquiry is limited to
evaluating independent compliance in each discrete area.
97. For instance, in Freeman, the seven factors used by the district court to evaluate compliance-student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, extracurricular activities, teacher and staff
assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education-may ignore systemwide indications of segregation that combine two or more of these areas.
98. See notes 140-144 infra and accompanying text. A supervising district court may examine
whether the school system has eliminated the racial identifiability of its schools, but only if the court
selects racial identifiability as a Green criterion for evaluating achievement of unitary status. See text
accompanying notes 91-97 supra. However, Freeman neither requires nor suggests that courts use racial identifiability as a Green area.
99. See text accompanying notes 140-144 infra.
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their schools were presumptively still segregated.' °° But after Freeman, racial
identifiability that persists throughout judicial supervision-but which does not
constitute segregation observable by the district court in independent evaluations of each Green area-may pass unnoticed and unremedied.

H. THE PERILs oF INcREmrrAL WrrmDRAWAL
A.

The Potentialfor Incremental Resegregation

Although Freeman's ultimate impact remains uncertain, 10 1 its approval of
incremental withdrawal may in some cases significantly undermine effective
desegregation. In addition to redefining "unitary" so that vestiges of the segregated system may survive judicial supervision undetected, 10 2 Freeman increases the likelihood that school districts will defacto resegregate before fully
complying with Brown. 10 3 Where district courts withdraw their supervision
incrementally, school officials will have complete control over released Green
areas. As a result, local authorities may lawfully take actions that aggravate
existing racial imbalances.1°4 In other words, Freeman allows nonunitary
school districts to enact policies that resegregate their schools.
The potential for incremental resegregation-the resegregation of unitary
Green areas prior to the school district's achieving full unitary status-certainly existed prior to Freeman. Since Spangler, it has been clear that district
courts cannot force a school district to take affirmative steps to keep a particular Green area desegregated once the school system has successfully desegregated that area.10 5 For example, the Freeman opinion indicates that
demographic shifts in DeKalb County unrelated to the school district's actions
caused resegregation in student assignment before the school district achieved
unitary status in all areas.' 0 6 But because the school district had fulfilled its
affirmative duty to desegregate with respect to student assignments, the district
court lacked the authority to compel the district to take affirmative steps to
redress these racial disparities. What is unprecedented about Freeman is that it
permits school districts themselves to take actions that contribute to such
resegregation. Freeman implicitly allows unlawfully segregated school systems to take steps that reverse the process of desegregation so long as such
steps are not motivated by discriminatory intent. By increasing the likelihood
100. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 866 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
presence of racially identifiable schools in a previously de jure system dispositively proves that the
school district remains unlawfully segregated), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992), reinstated, 978 F.2d
585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993) (Brown 111).
101. Freeman's effect on desegregation litigation will remain unclear until the Court decides
what showing plaintiffs will have to make for district courts to regain supervision over Green areas
released to local authorities. See text accompanying notes 162-168 infra.
102. See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
103. Such defacto resegregation does not raise constitutional concerns unless it is traceable to the
discriminatory system. See note 7 supra.
104. See Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, supra note 91, at 15-16.
105. See Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976); text accompanying
notes 70-74 supra.
106. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1438; see also text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
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of incremental resegregation, Freeman significantly increases the possibility
that, despite years of judicial supervision, school districts will never truly
desegregate.
In his concurring opinion in Freeman, Justice Souter raised the issue of
incremental resegregation. But he limited his discussion to resegregation attributable to remaining vestiges of the segregated system: "Even after attaining compliance as to student composition, other factors such as racial
composition of the faculty, quality of the physical plant, or per-pupil expenditures may leave schools racially identifiable.' "107 He further recognized that
the racial identifiability of the schools may in turn influence demographic shifts
that tend to resegregate the district.' 08 "In such a case," Justice Souter wrote,
"the vestige of discrimination in one factor will act as an incubator for resegregation in others." 1 0 9 He concluded that district courts should determine that
such resegregation presents "no immediate threat" before declaring a Green
area unitary. 110
By limiting his discussion to resegregation causally related to vestiges of
the unlawfully segregated system, however, Justice Souter did not address the
potential for resegregation due to actions taken by the school district itself. The
resegregation of released Green areas instigated by school officials' actionsunless somehow influenced by lingering segregation in nonunitary areas-is
entirely unrelated to the school district's original constitutional violation. As
such, it is not a vestige of the discriminatory system. Thus, even accepting
Justice Souter's opinion as the law, district courts lack the authority to prevent
incremental resegregation attributable to the affirmative acts of school
officials."'
Previous desegregation cases illustrate that, after achieving unitary status
and being completely released from judicial supervision, school systems are
susceptible to de facto resegregation. 112 The Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of such resegregation in Board of Education v. Dowell.'1 3 In
1963, a district court found that the Oklahoma City Public School Board had
intentionally segregated its schools by race and ordered the Board to dismantle
its de jure system. 14 After supervising the school system for nine years under
the initial order, the district court found that the school system was still
"dual," and in 1972 ordered the implementation of a remedial scheme known
107. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 1455.
109. Id.
110. Id. Because this type of resegregation is technically a vestige of the discriminatory system,
however, it may be combatted by the district court. See icL Freeman does not disturb the basic notion
that vestiges of past discrimination that linger in the school system are within the reach of district courts.
111. Unless the resegregation is directly traceable to past constitutional violations by the school
district, it is not a vestige of the discriminatory system and is not subject to judicial remedy. Id. at 1448.
112. See, e.g., Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a DesegregatedSociety?,

61 FoaRaAm L. Rv. 57, 60 (1992) (commenting that once a school district is removed from court
supervision, segregated housing patterns may lead to resegregation of schools).
113. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
114. See Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427, 447-48 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
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as the "Finger Plan." I1 5 Five years later, the district court determined that the
Oklahoma City schools had achieved unitary status and relinquished jurisdiction over the case. 116 Nevertheless, the school district voluntarily continued to
operate under the Finger Plan until 1985. In that year, school officials initiated
the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP)." 7 The SRP discontinued mandatory
remedial busing for students in kindergarten through fourth grade and instead
assigned these students based on neighborhood attendance zones. 118 Because
of extensive residential segregation in Oklahoma City, the SRP resulted in sevschools, and plaintiffs challenged its implementaeral predominantly one-race
119
tion as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the district court's desegregation order bound
the Oklahoma City school district only as long as it remained nonunitary. 2 0
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that desegregation decrees
"are not intended to operate in perpetuity."''
Instead, a school district is
relieved of the requirements of a desegregation order once it has complied in
good faith with the district court's decree and eliminated segregation traceable
to the discriminatory system "to the extent practicable." 122
The Court's holding in Dowell makes clear that, absent discriminatory in115. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 241; see also Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D.
Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
116. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237, 241-42.
117. Id.at 242.
118. Id.
119. Id.The plaintiffs claimed that "[u]nder the SRP, 11 of 64 elementary schools would be
greater than 90% black, 22 would be greater than 90% white plus other minorities, and 31 would be
racially mixed." Id The district court held that, because Oklahoma City schools had been effectively
integrated under the Finger Plan, the school district had achieved unitary status and the case should not
be reopened. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1555-57 (W.D. Okla. 1985). The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516
(10th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S. 938 (1986). On remand, the district court again found that existing
segregation was not a vestige of the formerly de jure system and that the SRP had not been adopted with
discriminatory intent. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1987). As a
result, the school board had fulfilled its obligations under the desegregation order and was allowed to
retain control of the district. lI On appeal, the Tenth Circuit again reversed, holding that school districts may extricate themselves from the obligations of a desegregation decree only upon a showing of
" 'dramatic changes in conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that both render the protections
of the decree unnecessary to effectuate the rights of the beneficiary and impose extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships' " on the school districts. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490
(10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 64 Tax. L. Rv. 1101, 1110 (1986)), rev'd, 498 U.S. 230 (1991).
One scholar has termed student assignment plans adopted after the withdrawal of court supervision
that result in substantial resegregation "retrogression plans." Brian K. Landsberg, The Desegregated
School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. REv. 789, 800 (1988). Landsberg analogizes to
voting rights law where, although the relevant claims are statutory rather than constitutional, courts have
used the term to describe "changes that, although arguably not infected with discriminatory intent,
'would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise.' " Id.at 800-01 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
In the context of school desgregation, Landsberg uses the term to "refer[ ]to a plan of student assignment which, while arguably not adopted with discriminatory intent, significantly increases the number
of minority students attending one-race schools." Id. at 801.
120. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237, 249.
121. Id. at 248.
122. Id. at 250.
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tent, unitary school systems may implement any policies they choose.123 A
school district that was once unlawfully segregated but that has successfully
desegregated and been declared unitary is no different than a school district
never tainted by segregation. As a result, once a court declares a school system
unitary, the school district "no longer requires court authorization for the promulgation of policies and rules."' 124 A unitary school system is therefore free
to take actions (such as Oklahoma City's implementation of the SRP) that exacerbate existing racial imbalances provided they are not motivated by discrimination. Defacto resegregation of school districts after they have been declared
unitary lies outside the scope of judicial remedy.125
Given Dowell's conception of unitary status, Freeman apparently allows
partially compliant school districts to implement any nondiscriminatory policy
in those Green areas that the district court has declared unitary. Consider, for
instance, a school district like DCSS that has discharged its affirmative duty to
desegregate student assignments, transportation, and physical facilities. Once
the district court withdraws supervision over these areas, local school officials
fully control all decisions concerning the alteration of the district's attendance
zones, the continuation of busing plans, which schools to close, and the location of new schools and magnet programs. Each of these decisions may aggravate existing racial imbalances. 12 6 For instance, if declining enrollment forces
a school district to close one of its high schools, it could choose to close its
most integrated campus. Or, if a district decides to build new schools or establish magnet programs, it could choose to locate them in predominantly one-race
neighborhoods. So long as a school district's actions are not motivated by discrimination, Freeman permits the district to implement such measures without
judicial interference.
Incremental withdrawal of court supervision may especially hinder the effective desegregation of school systems whose desegregation plans include
123. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
124. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250; see also Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1991) (noting that a finding of unitary status "removes the federal courts from their supervisory
role over the Board's decisions"); United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the attainment of unitary status "means that a school board is free to act without federal
supervision so long as the board does not purposefully discriminate").
125. One commentator has observed that "unitary school districts [are] free to choose from the
myriad of locally accepted methods for assigning students to various schools, including neighborhood
school assignments, despite the fact that these methods invariably increase racial concentration in
schools." Brown, supra note 4, at 1107 n.7.
126. The Tenth Circuit recently emphasized in Brown III that
courts must recognize that the school district's choices on such questions as where to locate
new schools, which schools to close, how to react to overcrowding or underutilization, and
what transfer policy to offer, all have obvious impact on the school attendance boundaries the
district can draw under a neighborhood school plan. If these choices are not made with an eye
toward desegregation, a neighborhood school plan may "further lock the school system into a
mold of separation of races."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 864-65 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971)) (footnote omitted), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992), reinstated, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2994 (1993).
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busing schemes or gerrymandered attendance zones. 127 Such plans are common where the effected community is residentially segregated so that neighbor128
hood attendance zones alone would not desegregate the school system.
Because busing and gerrymandered attendance zones are usually costly and
administratively inconvenient, school districts are apt to abandon such plans
once the district court has withdrawn supervision. 129 If school officials adopt
zones instead, these school districts likely will
neighborhood attendance
130
resegregate rapidly.
The Freeman Court partially anticipated that incremental withdrawal might
raise the potential for resegregation and included a safeguard against this result.
"Among the factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court in
ordering partial withdrawal," wrote Justice Kennedy, is "whether retention of
judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system." 13' Thus, district courts should retain
supervision over desegregated Green areas if foreseeable defacto resegregation
of those areas would impede the school district's progress toward unitary status
in areas that remain unlawfully segregated.
This safeguard, however, is wholly inadequate to combat the problems created by incremental withdrawal. First, it seeks only to prevent incremental
resegregation that the district court can anticipate when it contemplates returning supervision to local authorities. The safeguard therefore is entirely incapable of preventing resegregation caused by school district action subsequent
to the court's withdrawal of supervision. Such resegregation by its very nature
cannot be anticipated.' 32 Second, even if resegregation is foreseeable, the safeguard only compels district courts to retain supervision when resegregation of
the released area is likely to impede the desegregation of nonunitary Green
areas. Interference with compliance in other areas, however, is only one of
several dangers posed by incremental resegregation, as is explained more fully
Freeman offers little protection against incremental
below. In sum,
33
resegregation.'
127. See Tatel, supra note 18, at 67 ("If [courts] allow busing to end, many schools are likely to
return to their segregated status.").
128. For examples of communities where neighborhood attendance plans would not have encouraged desegregation, see Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237, and Swann, 402 U.S. at 1.
129. The Oklahoma City Public School Board adoption of the SRP provides an example of a
school district abandoning desegregation efforts once the district court withdrew supervision. See text
accompanying notes 116-119 supra
130. See, e.g., Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242 (resegregation under SRP); Riddick v. School Bd. of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) (resgregation after elimination of busing plan), cert. denied,479

U.S. 938 (1986).
131. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992).
132. See notes 126-130 supra and accompanying text.
133. An expansive interpretation of Justice Kennedy's safeguard language could conceivably
prevent resegregation if district courts were to hold that retaining supervision over all Green areas is
"necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system."
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446. But this point is purely academic because, regardless of how a district
court construes the safeguard language, it may still retain complete supervision over partially compliant
school districts under Freeman. Freeman permits-but does not require-district courts to withdraw
supervision incrementally in cases of partial compliance. The danger of Freeman therefore lies in how
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The Danger of PerpetuatingRacial Identifiability

The greatest danger posed by incremental resegregation is that it may result
in courts declaring school districts unitary without the districts ever having
eliminated the racial identifiability of their schools. Racial identifiability most
commonly refers to racial disparities in student enrollment. But a school sys134
tem may perpetuate its schools' racial identifiability through other means.
As the Supreme Court stated in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education,135 "[i]ndependent of student assignment, [it may be] possible to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by reference to the racial
composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities." 136 Indeed, four of the eight justices participating in the Freeman decision acknowledged that schools may
retain their racial identities in ways other than student enrollment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter wrote that "[e]ven after attaining compliance
as to student composition, other factors such as racial composition of the
faculty, quality of the physical plant, or per-pupil expenditures may leave
schools racially identifiable." 137 Similarly, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Stevens observed in their concurrence that "[s]chool systems can identify a
school as 'black' or 'white' in a variety of ways; choosing138to enroll a racially
identifiable student population is only the most obvious."
Because racial disparities in any aspect of a school system may perpetuate
racial identifiability, incremental resegregation may lead to school districts
never eliminating the racial identifiability of their schools. Consider, for instance, a school district that has successfully desegregated its student assignments but remains unlawfully segregated with respect to faculty and staff
assignments. If returned to local control, enrollment may resegregate before
the school district successfully desegregates its faculty and staff. Thus, a significant facet of the school system may remain segregated-either dejure or de
facto-at all points before, during, and after the desegregation process.
This problem is aggravated where a school district achieves compliance in
different Green areas at widely disparate times. Large time lags will inevitably
it will be used not by courts wishing to retain supervision, but by courts wanting to return control to
school officials as quickly as possible.
134. See 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2-3
(1967) (stating that "[t]he racial identity of Southern schools... is maintained in a variety of ways,"
including the "continued segregation of teaching staff"); ORFmLD, supra note 36, at 369 (noting that
"[tihe racial identity of the schools was reinforced by intense faculty segregation" in Cleveland's
public schools); Gary Orfield, School Segregation and ResidentialSegregation:A Social Science Statement, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 231, 236 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R
Feagin eds., 1980) (observing that "[a]ll discriminatory acts by school authorities ... contribute to the
racial identifiability of schools," including the assignment of minority teachers to large urban school
districts); Karl E. Taeuber, Housing, Schools, and Incremental Segregative Effects, 441 ANNALS Am.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 157, 164 (1979) (observing that Milwaukee's student assignment policy, "together with segregative assignment of teachers, have combined to cause, enhance, and maintain the
racial identifiability of schools and neighborhoods in Milwaukee").
135. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
136. Id. at 18.
137. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 1457 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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increase the likelihood that areas released from supervision will resegregate
prior to compliance in other areas. 1 39 Yet, once the school district achieves
unitary status in those areas that remain under judicial supervision, the district
court can dissolve its desegregation order regardless of the continued racial
identifiability of the schools.
As noted briefly earlier, eliminating the racial identifiability of a system's
schools is critical to effective desegregation. 140 Several desegregation decisions have emphasized that racial identifiability is a defining characteristic of
discriminatory school districts that court-ordered desegregation seeks to remedy. 14 1 The Court stated in Green, for instance, that segregated school systems
must "fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." 1 42 More
recently, in United States v. Fordice,143 the Court emphasized that it has "consistently asked whether existing racial identifiability is attributable to the
State" in determining whether the school system has satisfied its constitutional
obligations. 14 4
The incremental resegregation of nonunitary school districts creates the
danger that court-ordered desegregation will fail to eliminate the racial identifiability of an unlawfully segregated system's schools. According to the
Court's own opinions, this should be cause for serious concern. By opening the
door for school districts to take actions that resegregate unitary Green areas,
Freeman aggravates this danger. As a result, a primary objective of courtordered desegregation may in some cases remain unfulfilled.
IV.

THE ROLE

OF

DisTIcr

CouRTs IN PREVENTING INCREMENTAL

RESEGREGATION

The Road Not Taken: Prophylactic Supervision of Nonunitary Green
Areas
After Spangler, district courts could not require school districts to take affirmative steps to prevent unitary Green areas from resegregating. But consisA.

139. For instance, DCSS had fulfilled its affirmative duty to desegregate with respect to student
assignment as early as 1972, when it had closed its all-black schools and operated under a racially
neutral pattern of student assignment for three years. Id. at 1439. DCSS had yet to desegregate with
respect to the assignment of teachers by 1987. Id. at 1442. By that time, student assignment had de
facto resegregated because of the combination of residential patterns and the policy of assigning students
based on neighborhood attendance zones. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
140. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra. In the last desegregation case he participated in
prior to leaving the Bench, Justice Marshall wrote: "Against the background of former state-sponsorship
of one-race schools, the persistence of racially identifiable schools perpetuates the message of racial
inferiority associated with segregation. Therefore, such schools must be eliminated whenever feasible."
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. See notes 98-100 supraand accompanying text.
142. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
143. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
144. Id. at 2735; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring)
("The mere continued existence of single race [state-run] clubs does not make out a constitutional
violation."); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976) (courts may not interfere
with a school district's operation unless "school authorities have in some manner caused unconstitutional segregation").
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tent with its holding in Spangler, the Court in Freeman could have ruled that
district courts may not release any Green areas from supervision until the entire
system is successfully desegregated. Specifically, the Court could have required district courts to screen all proposed changes in school policies affecting
unitary facets of school systems. Such prophylactic supervision of unitary areas would be consistent with the limitations imposed by Spangler but would
prevent school districts from implementing policies that aggravate existing racial disparities before the school system has fully desegregated. By allowing
district courts to gradually return control to local authorities, Freeman disregards this potentially valuable intermediate stage in a school district's transition
from a dual to a unitary system.
Figure 1 illustrates the potential role of prophylactic supervision in cases of
partial compliance. It compares how district courts would scrutinize school
district actions involving Green areas over which school officials have retained
control under Freeman with how courts would scrutinize these same actions
under a prophylactic approach.
FIGURE 1:

SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE

AcrIONS

BY SCHOOL SYSTEMS

CONCERNING UNITARY GREN AREAS

Under Freeman
Approach

Discriminatory
Action with
Intent to
Segregate

Non-discriminatory
Action with
Segregatory
Effects

Action Without
Segregatory
Effects

Affirmative
Steps to
Remedy
Segregation

[A]

[B]

[C]

[D]

Unconstitutional

Acceptable

Acceptable

Acceptable but

not Required
Under CourtSupervised
Prophylactic Approach

[E]

[F]

[G]

[HI

Unconstitutional

Blocked by Court

Court's
Discretion,

Acceptable but
not Required

Likely
Acceptable

Whether under prophylactic supervision or not, school systems may not
implement policies motivated by discriminatory intent (points [A] and [E]). 145
Similarly, prophylactic supervision likely would not affect school district actions that neither aggravate nor mitigate racial disparities (points [C] and [G]);
these actions would remain acceptable. 1 " Prophylactic supervision also would
145. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
146. Technically, if a district court were to retain supervision, a school system would need prior
approval before enacting a neutral policy, whereas if control were returned to the school system, it could
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not alter the judicial treatment of a school system's affirmative efforts to desegregate (points [D] and [H]). Because of Spangler, district courts may not
require school districts to take affirmative steps to desegregate unitary Green
areas. 147 Prophylactic supervision would permit-but could not require-such
remedial steps.
Prophylactic supervision would prevent nonunitary school districts from enacting policies that, although not motivated by discriminatory intent, have
segregatory effects. Consider a school district (such as DCSS) that has successfully desegregated with respect to student assignments, and wishes to
redraw its attendance zones (to reduce transportation costs and administrative
inconvenience) in a manner that substantially resegregates its school system. If
the district court has relinquished control over student assignments as allowed
by Freeman, school officials may adjust attendance zones without judicial interference (point [B] on Figure 1). The segregatory effect of the modification
is irrelevant so long as the action is not motivated by discrimination. In contrast, if the district court retained prophylactic supervision over unitary Green
areas until the school district has achieved unitary status, the district court
148
would reject any proposed modifications that aggravate existing segregation.
Prophylactic supervision would therefore substantially reduce the likelihood of
incremental resegregation prior to total compliance. Mandating prophylactic
supervision by district courts would have been more faithful to the spirit of
Brown, promoting rather than hindering effective desegregation.
One might challenge this concern about incremental resegregation as excessive. Dowell and other cases illustrate that completely desegregated school dis149
tricts often quickly resegregate after district courts withdraw supervision.
One might argue that the gradual resegregation permitted by Freeman is ultimately inconsequential because in those cases where prophylactic supervision
could prevent incremental resegregation, such supervision would merely postpone the inevitable.
There are two responses to this argument. First, the possibility of future
resegregation cannot diminish a school district's obligation to comply with the
Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by Brown unequivocally requires the desegregation of all unlawfully segregated school districts.
Incremental withdrawal, by contrast, allows a school district that has yet to
comply with the Fourteenth Amendment to set in motion itself the process of
enact such policies at its discretion. In practice, however, a court would likely approve school district
policies that did not affect racial balance within the school system.
147. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-37 (1976); see also text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
148. It is important to note that even if the district court continued to supervise all areas in such
cases, it still could not completely prevent resegregation. Freeman is a perfect example. DCSS discharged its affirmative duty to desegregate student assignments soon after court supervision began.
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1439 (1992). Nevertheless, student attendance at DCSS schools has
subsequently resegregated because of demographic shifts in and around DeKalb County independent of
school district policies. Id. at 1447. Moreover, the resegregation occurred despite judicial supervision of
student assignments since 1969. Because the resegregation was not the result of actions taken by DCSS,
prophylactic supervision could not have prevented it.
149. See text accompanying notes 117-125 supra.
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resegregation. 150 Such resegregation is fundamentally different from resegregation subsequent to dismissal of the litigation because it undermines efforts to
remedy the school district's constitutional violations.' 5 1 Suggesting that this
sort of resegregation is ultimately inconsequential implies that compliance in
general is inconsequential. Segregated school districts should not in any way
be permitted to evade compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second response focuses on the practical effects of desegregation.
Although disagreement still surrounds the issue, 152 most research demonstrates
that desegregation has a lasting positive impact on the "life chances" of African-American students.' 53 For instance, a recent survey by Christopher Jencks
and Susan Mayer indicates that African-American students "learn[ ] more in
predominantly white schools than in predominantly black schools, even with
family background controlled."' 15 4 In addition, Professor Liebman notes that
desegregation has positive effects "on [the] dropout, teenage pregnancy, and
delinquency rates [of black students]; on the likelihood that blacks will attend
and succeed at college . . . secure employment in predominantly white job
settings, and live in integrated neighborhoods as adults; and on the salary levels
150. See text accompanying notes 104-105 supra
151. See text accompanying notes 126-130 supra.
152. Some notable African-American scholars remain skeptical about whether school desegregation ultimately benefits blacks. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUsT FOR
RAciAL JUSTICE 102-22 (1987) (contending that racial integration is no guarantee of effective education
for black children and may in some cases disadvantage them); THOMAS SowaLL, CrVIL RIOHTS: RHEToRIC OR REAsrry? 61-72 (1984) (challenging desegregation's underlying assumption that racial integration is essential to equality of education).
153. See Liebman, supra note 7, at 356-58 (reviewing studies indicating that integration "improve[s] the 'life chances' of blacks"). For additional literature discussing the positive impact of
school desegregation on the "life chances" of affected students, see generally ROBERT L. CrN & JACK
STRAUSS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK OCCUPATIONAL

AraraNmrm:

RESULTS FROM A LONG-

TERM ExPERimENT (1985); Jomills Henry Braddock II, Robert L. Crain & James M. McPartland, A
Long-Term View of School Desegregation:Some Recent Studies of Graduatesas Adults, 66 Pm DELTA
KAPIAN 259 (1984); Jomills Henry Braddock H & James M. McPartland, The Social and Academic
Consequences ofSchool Desegregation,EQurrY & CHoiCE, Feb. 1988, at 5; Rita E. Mahard & Robert L.
Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in DesegregatedSchools, in THE CoNsEqUrNcEs OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATiON 103 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New
Patternsof Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RtrrERs L. REV. 673 (1985); William
L. Taylor, The CrucialRole of Education in Achieving the CivilRights Goals of the 1980's, 37 RUrGEs
L. REV. 961 (1985). For a less optimistic opinion of desegregation's tangible results, see GEOFFREY R.
STONE, Louis M. S~amDmAN, CASS R. SuNsrmN & MARK V. Tusm4Er, CONsTrrrUIoNAL LAw 530-31 (2d

ed. 1991) (contending that "[wihile there is no proof that integration has reduced white achievement
levels, neither is there proof that it has aided blacks in any demonstrable fashion").
154. Susan Mayer & Christopher Jenks, Growing Up in PoorNeighborhoods:How Much Does It
Matter?, 243 ScIENCE 1441, 1442-43 (1989). Another commentator has unequivocally concluded:
School desegregation has benefited disadvantaged groups enormously. In the generation since
executive branch and court-ordered desegregation plans have significantly desegregated
schools, minority student performance in desegregated public schools has improved greatly.
Minorities' performances on standardized achievement and intelligence quotient tests have
risen in desegregated settings, as have career opportunities of minorities attending desegregated schools.
Eric S. Stein, Note, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch. 99 YALE L.J. 2003, 2003 (1990)
(citations omitted); see also Mahard & Crain, supra note 153, at 121 ("It seems reasonably clear that
minority children who attend desegregated schools perform better on standardized achievement tests
than do similar students who attend segregated schools.").
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blacks attain in the labor market." 155 Thus, even if the desegregation of a
school district is ultimately ephemeral, it may provide substantial benefits to
those students able to attend integrated schools.
Another important benefit of school desegregation is that it can stabilize
demographic shifts within a community, thereby stunting residential segregation and its accompanying problems. The Supreme Court has long recognized
the interrelation of school segregation and private housing choices. In Keyes
v. School District No. 1, the Court stated that racial identifiability of schools
'may have a profound reciprocal effect on the racial composition of residential
neighborhoods within a metropolitan area." 156 Similarly, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court acknowledged that
"[p]eople gravitate toward school facilities" and that schools' locations "may
thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area
157
and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods."
Moreover, researchers have discredited speculation that "desegregation efforts
might trigger such a large exodus of white students that racial isolation actually
increases." 158 For example, a study by Diana Pierce showed that metropolitanarea school desegregation significantly increased a region's level of residential
integration regardless of school district size and geographic region.' 59 As a
review of the relevant research concluded, "[t]he right kind of school desegregation plan can slow the process of racial change and encourage residential
desegregation." 160 Thus, incremental withdrawal of district court supervision
that prevents effective desegregation can foreclose an opportunity to stabilize a
community's demographic shifts. As a result, communities may lose forever a
chance for complete and lasting integration. 16 '
B.

The Lingering Question: Under What ConditionsMay a District Court
Reassert Control over Released Areas of Operation?
The Freeman Court stated that district courts may return control of unitary
155.
156.
157.

Liebman, supra note 7, at 356-57 (footnote omitted).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).

158. FiNs WELCH & AuDREY LIorr, NEw EvmENcE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 66-67 (1987).
159. DIANA PEARCE, BREAING DowN BARRmES: NEw EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF METRoPouTAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON HOusING PATrERNS (1980).

160.

WILLS D. HAwLEY, ROBERT L. CRAIN, CHmsmaee H. RossE.L, MARK A. SMYL,

RiCARro

R. FERNANDEZ, JANET W. ScHOFIm.mz, RACHEL ToMPKINs, WmLsAm T. TaENT & MARILYN S. ZLOTNIK,
STRArEGIES FOR EFFcFriVE DESEGREGATION: LESSONS FROM RESEARCH 63 (1983). For an account of

how metropolitan-wide desegregation helped to stabilize demographic shifts and promote residential
integration in Charlotte, North Carolina, see FRYE GAILARD, THE DREAM LONG DmRRED 155-59

(1988).
161. Various studies have reached the following conclusions: (1) "the effects of schools on demography might be greater than the impact of demographic changes on schools;" (2) "school districts
have considerable power to help shape and maintain housing patterns, either for the purpose of encouraging desegregation, or for the purpose of reinforcing segregation in both schools and housing;" and (3)
"extensive court-ordered plans may actually foster demographic stability," as evidenced by the fact that
"[1ong lasting desegregation has been achieved in many districts." Brief of the NAACP, DeKalb
County, Georgia, Branch of the NAACP et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents app. at 3-5,
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (No. 89-1290).
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Green areas to local authorities and limit judicial supervision to Green areas
still segregated. 162 But Freeman did not define the conditions under which a
district court may regain control over such areas once they have been returned
163
to local control.
One possible standard is that articulated in Board of Education v. Dowell.
In Dowell, the Court stated that, once a school district achieves total compliance and the district court dissolves its desegregation order, the district court
may reassert control over the system only upon proof of an independent constitutional violation.164 Absent evidence that resegregation is traceable to new
instances of purposeful discrimination by school officials, district courts cannot
reestablish jurisdiction regardless of the degree to which the system
resegregates.1 65
The problem with the Dowell standard is that it is often insuperable, not
only because resegregation is most frequently attributable to nondiscriminatory
action, but also because of the practical difficulties in proving purposeful discrimination.1 66 Such a stringent standard seems inappropriate in cases of partial compliance such as Freeman. Instead, the standard should be that of
"reasonable necessity": Courts should reassert control over a previously released Green area upon a showing that judicial supervision of that area is "reasonably necessary" to the school district's achievement of unitary status.
Under a reasonable necessity standard, plaintiffs could prevent school officials from enacting policies that would resegregate released areas. Consider
again a partially compliant school district that has achieved unitary status with
respect to student assignments. If the school district altered its attendance
zones in a way that aggravated racial imbalance and impeded the desegregation
of areas still unlawfully segregated, plaintiffs could petition the district court to
reassert control over student assignments. If the court found that the prevention
of resegregation in student assignments was "reasonably necessary" to the
school system's complete desegregation, the court could reestablish its supervision over this area. Thereafter, the court could screen all proposed modifica162. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445-46 (1992).
163. In his concurrence, Justice Souter stated that since "the district court retains jurisdiction
over the case, it should . . . reassert control over student assignment[ I" if it determines that "the
vestige of discrimination in one factor will act as an incubation for resegregation [in student assignments]." Id. at 1455 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter, however, did not address the problem of
resegregation caused by actions of the school district. See notes 107-111 supraand accompanying text.

164. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991). As the Court stated in United States
v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992), "if challenged policies are not rooted in the prior dual system, the
question becomes whether the fact of racial separation establishes a new violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment under traditional principles." Id. at 2737 n.6.
165. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
166. As one commentator recentiy noted,
proving discriminatory intent by school boards has become increasingly difficult as school
boards today are far more likely to mask discriminatory motives than in the past. Unlike
twenty-five years ago when many school boards openly segregated schools, current government actors veil their intent by avoiding the creation of a "paper trail" that would facilitate
findings of discrimination.
Stein, supra note 154, at 2004 (citations omitted). As Stein points out, plaintiffs have failed to establish
liability in several recent desegregation cases for precisely this reason. See id. at 2004 n. 11.
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tions to student assignment policy to ensure that any changes would not hinder
efforts to remedy lingering segregation. Although the school district would be
under no obligation to take affirmative steps to desegregate with respect to
student assignment, reestablished judicial supervision could inhibit local authorities' ability to take actions leading to rapid resegregation.' 67
While the adoption of a reasonable necessity standard would make incremental resegregation less likely, it would be much less effective than prophylactic supervision by district courts.' 68 Prophylactic supervision would prevent
all modifications to school policies that have segregatory effects; a reasonable
necessity standard could only prevent such modifications where such resegregation is likely to impede the school district's progress toward unitary status.
Nevertheless, a standard of reasonable necessity could mitigate the potentially
detrimental effects of incremental withdrawal on effective desegregation.
CONCLUSION

More than thirty-eight years have passed since the Supreme Court decided
Brown v. Board of Education, yet today America's public schools are still
largely separate and unequal.' 69 In each desegregation case, a court must balance several competing objectives. In Freeman, the Court focused on the particular importance of one of these objectives, namely returning elementary and
secondary schools to community control.' 70 While local autonomy in the field
of public education is indeed important, it should not be emphasized at the
expense of the other "ultimate objective": the effective desegregation of previously segregated school districts.' 7' The Court could have decided Freeman
167. Note that once the district court reasserts control over a Green area, its task is the same as
prophylactic supervision. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
169. According to the United States Department of Education, 9 of the country's 10 largest
school districts, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Philadelphia, Detroit, Houston, and
Dallas, had white enrollments of less than 27% in 1984. CETmR FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, U.S.
DA amENr OF EDUCATION, Tnm CONDTION OF EDUCATION 179, tbl. 1:27-1 (Joyce B. Stem ed., 1987);
see also CoMMrrrEm ON THE STATUs OF BLACK AMERICANS, NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AN AmRiCAN SoCIErY 379 (Gerald David Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr.
eds., 1989) (concluding that "[s]egregation and differential treatment of blacks continue to be widespread in schools"); STONE ET AL., supra note 153, at 530 (noting that recent data indicates that "about
a third of black students nationwide attended schools with virtually all-black enrollments and over 63
percent attended schools that were at least 50 percent black"); Brown, supranote 4, at 1106 (stating that
"[o]ver thirty-five years [after Brown 1]... de jure segregation of public school students has been
replaced by de facto segregation in many areas of the country") (footnotes omitted); Shaw, supranote
112, at 60 (concluding that we are entering the next century "with a legacy of separate and unequal
schools"); Tatel, supra note 18, at 62 (noting that "18 of the 45 largest central city school districts in
the country are 70 percent or more minority"). For vivid descriptions of the inequality of educational
opportunity for students attending inner-city schools with predominantly minority student bodies, see
AL~x Komowrrz, TamPr ARE No CmLDRm Hma: Tim STORY OF Two Boys GROWING UP IN M
OTHER AMEmA (1991), and JONATHAN Kozoi, SAVAGE INEQUALITIEs: CHILDREN IN AMERICA's
SCHOOLS (1991).
170. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
171. Justice Marshall dissented for precisely this reason in Dowell v. Board of Education, 498
U.S. 237 (1991). He felt that the majority's decision "risks subordination of the constitutional rights of
Afro-American children to the interest of school board autonomy," and that while "the courts must
consider the value of local control, . . . that factor primarily relates to the feasibility of a remedial
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differently, consistent with its precedent, in a manner that would have promoted, rather than hindered, effective desegregation. But in its haste to return
control over school systems to local authorities, the Court seems to have forgotten one of its most enduring messages, that "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." 172 As the late Justice Thurgood Marshall warned: "Our
nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to remedy separate and
unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little
hope that our people will ever learn to live together.''173

measure .. .not whether the constitutional violation has been remedied." Id. at 267 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
172. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 495 (1954) (Brown 1).
173. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Milliken 1).
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